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SCOTT GRIMM
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Crime INVESTIGATIONS: THE COUNTABILITY
PROFILE OF A DELINQUENT NOUN
ABSTRACT: This paper aims to broaden our understanding of
countability beyond what is found with concrete nouns, providing
a one-word case study of the countable and non-countable uses
of the noun crime. I show that the behavior of crime runs counter
to a variety of expectations inherited from the literature on count-
ability: its countable use cannot be directly grounded in atomic
acts or events, nor is its non-countable use simply equivalent to
a plural individual composed of individual crimes, as one might
expect on analogy with certain analyses of furniture. Additionally,
while crime has a use as a bare plural, that use does not refer to a
kind. A quantitative study supports these conclusions. Altogether,
crime demonstrates a novel noun type with respect to its nominal
semantics and countability behavior, which is also an indication
of the large empirical terrain that awaits exploration for eventive
and abstract nouns.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper has the modest goal of investigating the countability of one
word, crime, and examining its implications for our general understand-
ing of countability.1 The interest of this noun and similar nouns is clear.
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The bulk of the countability literature following Link (1983) has fo-
cused on mereological properties, such as atomicity or cumulativity,
related to nouns designating concrete objects, such as dog or tree. As
will be shown, the word crime presents difficulties for both theories of
countable nouns and non-countable nouns since its countability behav-
ior is not determined in the same way by mereological properties nor by
other properties familiar from the countability literature. If the source
of countability contrasts for more abstract or eventive nouns such as
crime is different from mereological properties, then a more general
account of countability is needed, regardless of how important mereo-
logical properties may be for concrete nouns. In some sense, this paper
is a companion piece to Grimm (2014) which examined several do-
mains of abstract nouns, showing that the terrain is more difficult than
the classical picture predicts.2
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines both count-
able and non-countable uses of crime, using a range of diagnostics from
the literature. I first argue that the behavior of countable crime is far
more intricate than one might anticipate, and further cannot be deter-
mined based on properties of individual crime acts or events. I then
compare non-countable crime with other non-countable noun types,
such as substance nouns (water) or artifactual aggregates (furniture),
showing that non-countable crime differs: it designates (sets of) indi-
vidual criminal acts, but these are not grammatically accessible. I fur-
ther distinguish kind-referring uses of crime, showing that while there is
a bare plural usage of crime, it does not refer to a kind as one would ex-
pect, rather this responsibility is taken up by the bare singular use. Sec-
tion 3 presents a quantitative study to assess the distributional charac-
teristics of canonical countable and non-countable nouns and to assess
crime’s position relative to these nouns, ultimately providing support
for the distinctions made in section 2. Section 4 provides a conclusion
and directions for future work.
2. DIAGNOSING CRIME
Crime, like many nouns, manifests a non-countable and countable use,
shown in (1).
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(1) a. Ed prosecuted many crimes. (countable)
b. The mayor worried about crime. (non-countable)
Theories of countability make relatively clear predictions of where the
difference between these two uses should lie. The use of crime in (1-a)
should refer to a plurality of individual crime entities, presumably events,
which satisfy whatever property is asserted to correspond to carving out
individuals from the flux of the world, e.g. atomiticity. In contrast, the
use of crime in (1-b) should reference entities which manifest proper-
ties such as divisiveness or cumulativity. Neither of these suppositions
is straightforwardly fulfilled, it turns out, although there will be partial
connections. I first examine the behavior of countable crime and then
turn to non-countable crime.
2.1. Countable Crime
A person is robbed on three particular occasions: this can be described
as three crimes, where the distinct events are what is counted, as in (2).
That much is intuitively clear.
(2) Three crimes took place on 145th St.
The performance of countable uses of crime with the standard mere-
ological diagnostics, however, is mixed. Here I am assuming the stan-
dard second-order mereological properties widely assumed following
the work of Quine (1960), Cheng (1973), and Link (1983), namely
ATOMICITY, CUMULATIVITY and DIVISIBILITY, given in (3), (4) and (5),
respectively.
(3) Atomic(P) = ∀x[P(x)→∃y[y ≤ x ∧Atomic(y, P)]]
(4) Cumulative(P) = [P(x) ∧ P(y)→ P(x ⊕ y)]]
(5) Divisive(P) = ∀x[P(x)→∀y[y < x → P(y)]]
The countable use of crime, as expected, is clearly neither gener-
ally cumulative, as witnessed in (6), nor is it divisive, since there is no
guarantee that a crime may be subdivided into smaller crimes.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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(6) There was a crime in the parking lot.
There was a crime in the alley.
; There was a crime in the parking lot and in the alley.
Yet, contrary to expectations, it is not clear that crime qualifies as atomic,
since an event which is considered to be a crime may indeed contain an
event which is yet again a crime, e.g. an event of robbery may contain
a sub-event of breaking and entering, both of which would qualify as
crimes.
Countable crime offers up a host of difficulties for a semantic anal-
ysis. First, even identifying whether an act3 qualifies as a crime can be
a difficult matter in itself, for determining if an act qualifies as a crime
is dependent on how that act is judged within a societal and/or legal
context. This situation is unlike, say, that of natural kind nouns such
as water, where one looks to the entity itself to determine whether a
substance qualifies as water, or for an act of walking, where one can ex-
amine the act itself to determine if it qualifies as an instance of walking
(were the legs moving?, etc.). This can be clearly seen in that whether
an act qualifies as a crime can change from era to era4, yet whether an
act qualifies as walking presumably does not change. Thus, no act is in-
herently a crime, but crime serves as a classification over acts—naming
those which, through social stipulation, are taken to be punishable.
This indeterminacy concerning which acts qualify as crime bleeds
over into how crimes are counted. Moreover, how to count crimes is
not merely a theoretical issue, but one of consequence in the legal field
that has occupied the US Supreme Court, among others. Chemerinsky
(2009) discusses a wide range of legal cases where the mapping be-
tween the number of acts or (pre-theoretic) events and the number of
independent crimes are at odds. In one case, Hennemeyer v. Common-
wealth, a man had two altercations with the police on two consecutive
days. On the first day he fired a gun four times within the space of a
few minutes, and on the second day he fired a gun six times at the po-
lice in lengthier intervals. The court ruled that the first four shots were
a single crime, considered a “single course of action" while the sub-
sequent six shots were “each considered discrete crimes” (Chemerin-
sky 2009, p. 726). Thus while criteria which determine the number of
gun firing acts are reasonably clear cut, they do not match the number
of crimes as determined by the court. The conclusion appears to be
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that efforts to anchor counting crimes on properties of the events which
crime describes, here shootings, will suffer fatal setbacks. Difficulties
arise for counting crimes in the other direction as well: a single act
can be considered as two or more crimes. Crain (1959) discusses sev-
eral such cases where a single act had multiple effects, and therefore
were treated as multiple and distinct crimes. For instance, in one case
a man “wounded two officers with one blast from a shotgun. He was
convicted for two assaults and given a ten-year sentence for each. . . "
(p. 869) In this case, since there are two effects there are two crimes.
Alternately, a single act may violate two separate laws or statutes, and
thereby constitutes two separate crimes. As discussed on a variety of
legal websites5, cases of drunk driving often involve charges of two
distinct crimes related to one act of driving: driving under the influ-
ence while intoxicated and driving with a blood-alcohol content level
of 0.08% or higher. Other examples of one act counted as two crimes
include “a defendant who allegedly had sex with someone after the per-
son had passed out from drinking too much alcohol. The defendant was
convicted of rape of an unconscious person under California Penal Code
Section 261(a)(4) and rape of an intoxicated person under California
Penal Code Section 261(a)(3).”
This situation is very different than usually obtains for the entities
or events discussed in the countability literature, where determining
multiple instances of an entity or event relies upon those multiple in-
stances being spatially or temporally distinct. For instance, in previ-
ous work, where I had limited myself to natural concrete entities, I
required countable nouns to refer to entities which were topologically
separated (Grimm 2012), and others have posed similar conditions,
such as Rothstein’s (2010) requirement that entities be (contextually)
non-overlapping or Landman’s (This Volume) requirement of (contex-
tual) disjointness. This would not seem to apply to the cases just dis-
cussed: For the drunk driver charged with two crimes, there are no
separate or disjoint acts or events to point to which would correspond
to “driving under the influence while intoxicated” and “driving with a
blood-alcohol content level of 0.08% or higher”, to the contrary, they
often may be completely co-extensional.
The upshot of this discussion is that for countable uses of crime, it
is not the act or event in itself which provides criteria for individuation
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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of crime, but external judgments about the content of the act or event.
One act can count as multiple violations, and multiple acts can count as
only one violation. Further, the context can change, i.e. in the case of a
different judge who has a different interpretation of the law, resulting in
greater or fewer crimes, without having greater or fewer discrete acts.
Part of the issue is likely that crime does not provide a description of a
particular type of event, in the way that, say, robbery does; but rather
serves as a classification over acts in terms of whether they violate laws.
In sum, the behavior of countable crime flies in the face of the main
trend in the countability literature to derive countability classes from
the mereological, spatial or temporal properties of entities or events.
Instead, what is critical for counting crimes is how the act or acts relate
to the laws.
2.2. Non-Countable Crime
While the intuitions of what is counted by countable uses of crime are
challenging, the intuitions of precisely what the bare singular use of
crime refers to are yet murkier. I will first contrast the semantic and
distributional behavior of crime with what is known about other rel-
evant noun types: substance nouns and aggregate nouns, for the lat-
ter, artifactual aggregate nouns like furniture and collective aggregate
nouns like foliage are canonical examples. I will then go on to examine
the relation between the different forms of crime and their propensity
to support kind/generic readings. I will suggest that non-countable
crime does not make individual crime events accessible, instead desig-
nating non-particularized reference, which contrasts on the one hand
with countable crime, which makes reference to particular acts/events,
and on the other hand with kind-reference achieved through uses of
the bare singular.
2.2.1. Non-Countable Crime as Analogous to Non-Countable Substance
Nouns
Although it is intuitively clear that the non-countable use of crime differs
from the more familiar non-countable nouns of substance (water, gold,
oil), it is useful examining to what extent the characterizing properties
hold for crime. Cumulativity clearly holds for non-countable crime, as
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shown in (7).
(7) There was crime in the parking lot.
There was crime in the alley.
⇒ There was crime in the parking lot and in the alley.
Yet, as is well known, satisfying cumulativity does not distinguish be-
tween terms with “mass” reference and terms with plural reference.
Turning to divisiveness, which potentially could distinguish mass
from plural reference, it is very difficult, in general, to use the diagnostic
with crime, as seen by considering the use of a substance noun water in
(8). Intuitively considering the portion of water asserted to be on the
table, one would conclude that any smaller entity contained within the
water also qualified as water. The use of crime in (9) differs: it is not
obvious exactly what event is asserted, and due to this vagueness, it is
less than clear how to examine sub-events and determine if they qualify
as crime as well.
(8) There is water on this table.
(9) There is crime on this street.
Further, it seems intuitively clear that, whatever crime refers to, it bot-
toms out at individual criminal acts or events, rather than any sort of
crime “stuff”. I conclude given the above that non-countable crime can-
not be forced into denoting some sort of “abstract stuff” or other sub-
stance interpretation, but must indeed refer to individuals of some sort.
2.2.2. Non-Countable Crime as an Aggregate Noun
If individuals are critical to the designation of crime, the subsequent
question is whether the type of reference associated with bare singu-
lar crime resembles various aggregate nouns discussed in the litera-
ture, such as what I term artifactual aggregates, e.g. the bare singu-
lar noun furniture which has received substantial attention (see Chier-
chia 1998b; Barner & Snedeker 2005; Deal To appear among others)
or collective aggregate nouns such as foliage (see Grimm 2012 for dis-
cussion). I will consider the two types of nouns in turn.
Despite the obvious difference that artifactual aggregates, such as
furniture, achieve references to concrete objects in the world, e.g. chairs
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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and the like which serve as furniture, while crime references events,
each of which itself can be described as a crime, an analogue could be
found between concrete objects which are found in the denotation of
furniture and events which are found in the denotation of crime. On
this view, could not crime itself be the sum of all crimes, as Chierchia
(1998b) has suggested for furniture?
Several further shared characteristics strengthen the potential par-
allel. Furniture references objects which have distinct names, e.g. chair
or table, as crime analogously does, referencing acts which often have
distinct names, such robbery or theft. Also like furniture, uses of non-
countable crime can be shown to include singularities, here of events,
as shown in (10).
(10) a. There was furniture in this room.
⇒ can be true when there was just one piece of furniture
b. There has been crime on this street.
⇒ can be true when there was just one crime
Accordingly, there is a case to be made that just as the denotation
of furniture is often analyzed as constituted by pluralities of pieces of
furniture (Chierchia 1998b; Bale & Barner 2009), crime could be an-
alyzed as constituted by pluralities of individual crimes. I will argue
that a range of data shows that this is not feasible, since non-countable
crime and plural crimes have distinct meanings, although clearly there
is some relation between the denotation of the bare singular crime and
the denotation of countable crime that must be accounted for.
One of the striking characteristics of furniture is the accessibility of
individual pieces, and here furniture contrasts starkly with crime. I will
present several diagnostics showing how this differs for non-countable
crime, for which individuals are not accessible.
That the individual pieces of furniture are accessible has been shown
by furniture’s ability to combine with various grammatical elements that
impose a distributive reading. As pointed out by Schwarzschild (2011),
when furniture is modified by big, or other “stubbornly distributive”
modifiers such as circular, the only reading available is one in which
the pieces are big, as opposed to the reading where the collection of
furniture is large.6
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(11) a. big furniture⇒ ✓pieces are big, ✗collection is big
b. circular furniture ⇒ ✓pieces are circular, ✗collection is
circular
This behavior does not find a parallel with crime, as the accessibil-
ity of individual crime events appears to be lacking. While this cannot
be detected using “stubbornly distributive” adjectives such as circular or
big7, since those adjectives do not apply well to eventive nouns, through
using other adjectives one can observed distibutional and meaning con-
trasts in this domain. Adjectives designating emotional responses, such
as abominable, appalling, horrible, or sickening, show a distributional
asymmetry in the large corpus to be discussed in section 3: they are
abundantly present with bare plurals and other countable uses, but
never found with non-countable uses. This contrast can also be seen
in (12): when modifying bare plural crime, shocking distributes to the
individual events, yet, a parallel use of shocking shown in (13) with the
bare singular crime is degraded. Furthermore, inasmuch as an inter-
pretation can be recovered from (13-b), it does not concern individual
shocking crime events.
(12) a. Crimes rattled the community.
b. Shocking crimes rattled the community.
→ each crime was shocking
(13) a. Crime rattled the community.
b. ?Shocking crime rattled the community.
It is possible to construct examples combining such adjectives with
the non-countable use of crime and the definite determiner; yet, here
meaning contrasts emerge. In (14-a), a predicative use of appalling
with the definite plural of crime as subject preferentially yields a dis-
tributive reading, although given appropriate contextual support the
collective reading may also be possible. The prenominal use in (14-b)
only permits the distributive reading.8 On the hypothesis where non-
countable crime makes individuals, or atoms, accessible in the same
manner that furniture or other artifactual aggregates do, the distribu-
tive readings should be available. This is shown to not be the case in
(15) where, for the same sentences with non-countable crime in the
subject position, the distributive reading is barred, and only the collec-
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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tive reading is possible.
(14) a. The crimes in Miami are appalling/horrible.
⇒ (✓distributive, collective possible)
b. The appalling crimes in Miami are the mayor’s first prior-
ity.
⇒ (✓distributive, ✗collective)
(15) a. The crime in Miami is appalling/horrible.
⇒ (✗distributive, ✓collective)
b. The appalling crime in Miami is the mayor’s first priority.
⇒ (✗distributive, ✓collective)
A different diagnostic uses predicates which reference cardinality
such as is numerous. They combine felicitously with furniture, as in
(16-a), where the pieces are counted, although this is impossible for
substance nouns, as shown in (16-b) in absence of enriched meaning,
e.g. a packaging interpretation.
(16) a. The furniture is numerous.
b. ?The water is numerous.
Applying the predicate is numerous to non-countable crime, as in (17-a),
results in oddity. The same results hold in the object position of verbs
such as enumerate or count. Artifactual aggregates such as furniture
make individual pieces accessible, licensing their use with such verbs,
as in (18). While, as expected, the plural of crime is licensed in the
object position of these verbs, non-countable crime is not, as shown in
(19).9
(17) a. ?The crime in Miami is numerous.
b. The crimes in Miami are numerous.
(18) The bankruptcy judge enumerated/counted the furniture/jewelry.
(19) a. The council member enumerated/counted crimes that oc-
curred on the waterfront this spring.
b. ?The council member enumerated/counted crime that oc-
curred on the waterfront this spring.
A further diagnostic which brings about a contrast between the plu-
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ral and the singular use of crime is their behavior as objects of percep-
tual reports. It is often assumed that events are perceptible, and a cor-
responding linguistic diagnostic is that event-denoting phrases are felic-
itous as complements of perception verbs (Higginbotham 1983; Maien-
born 2011). This is indeed the case for crimes, yet not for bare singular
crime, as shown in (20) and (21).
(20) a. Ed saw crimes on that street corner.
b. ?Ed saw crime on that street corner.
(21) a. Ed heard crimes taking place in the apartment above me.
b. ?Ed heard crime taking place in the apartment above me.
This indicates that bare singular crime does not directly refer to a per-
ceptible event or activity, even if it indirectly refers to events, e.g. crimes,
which are perceptible.
In sum, the data indicate that the designation of non-countable
crime is not equivalent to a plural individual composed of individual
crimes.
This contrast argues against a strong view upon which the meaning of
crime could be reduced to a plural individual, i.e. to the meaning of
crimes.
I will briefly discuss a different analytic possibility, namely that non-
countable crime may not qualify as a variety of collective aggregate,
akin to foliage. This idea receives some support from lexicographers,
who have sometimes regarded the non-countable use of crime to be a
sort of collective. The entry for crime from Oxford English Dictionary
(2012), sense 2, distinguishes the countable and non-countable uses of
crime:
(22) 2.a An act or omission constituting an offence (usually a grave
one) against an individual or the state and punishable by law.
2.b Such acts collectively; breaking of the law.
While there would appear to be some overlap in the designation of
non-countable crime and a collection of crimes, it would not be apt to
analyze non-countable crime amongst grammatical collectives. Gram-
matical collectives typically have the notional characteristic that the
entities described by the collective are related in some manner, and
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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therein lies the reason for their belonging to the collective class. A
typical example would be spatial proximity, whereby nouns describing
swarming insects are often collectives since their referents habitually
are spatially proximate to one another. As far as I can discern, this is
not a notional characteristic found with crime, as crimes do not cluster
together temporally or spatially.
2.2.3. Non-Countable Crime as a Kind Referring Noun
The discussion so far has shown that the grammatical and semantic
behavior of non-countable crime does not pattern with either substance
nouns or artificatual aggregate nouns. It is worth pursing a different
line of inquiry, and determining whether the grammatical and semantic
behavior of non-countable crime might pattern with kind reference.
There is a further puzzle for theories of genericity that arises as
well. For countable nouns, the bare plural form is used to refer to kinds,
while, for non-countable nouns, the bare singular form is used to refer
to kinds. Since crime has bona fide uses both as a countable and non-
countable noun, what will the division of labor for reference to kinds
be? In particular, is there a difference predicted between bare plural
‘crimes’ and bare singular ‘crime’?
Both the bare singular and the bare plural form of crime can be
used in characterizing sentences (see Krifka et al. 1995) without a great
change in meaning, as shown in (23) for non-countable crime and in
(24) for countable crime.
(23) a. Crime usually occurs where or when there are few (if any)
witnesses, so lighting levels are irrelevant.
http://www.winchelsea.net/images/lightandcrime.pdf
b. Crimes usually occur where or when there are few (if any)
witnesses. . .
(24) a. Know where crimes usually happen, and be safe . . . presenting
the Cordillera Crime Map of the Police Regional Office. h
ttps://www.facebook.com/UCjaguars/posts/710528225
b. Know where crime usually happens . . .
Behavior with kind predicates, such as be extinct or be widespread,
is more informative. Non-countable crime does felicitously occur with
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kind predicates, as shown in (25), while these sentences appear to be
degraded when the bare plural crimes is used, shown in (26).
(25) a. Crime will soon be extinct.
b. Crime is widespread.
(26) a. ?Crimes will soon be extinct.
b. ?Crimes are widespread.
The observed contrast is supported by examining the differing rate
of occurrence for the bare singular and bare plural forms. Bare singular
crime occurs with the predicate extinct robustly in Google searches, an
example of which is given in (27). Even the more restricted search
term “crime is extinct" returned 4 examples, of which (27-b) is one. In
contrast, the bare plural version was not observed. Similar results held
with the predicate widespread, as shown in (28), except that the string
“crimes are widespread” was frequently found, but this occurred only
when a subkind reading was present, e.g. violent crimes.
(27) a. Could crime become extinct? Staggering figures show





b. Forty years in future America, crime is extinct. The U.S. is
under strict surveillance and privacy is a thing of the past.
https://www.wattpad.com/story/75218885-the-affinity-
between-our-stars
(28) Crime is widespread in Honduras and requires a high degree
of caution by U.S. visitors and residents alike.
www.countryreports.org/travel/Honduras/crimes.htm
Other environments known to harbor instances of nouns making ref-
erence to kinds, such as the direct object of psychological predicates
(Glasbey 1994), also manifest contrasts between the use of the bare
singular or the bare plural, as in (29): the bare singular is clearly li-
censed, while the bare plural is dispreferred, unless a subkind reading
obtains, as in (29-c).
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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(29) a. The mayor hates/dislikes crime.
b. ?The mayor hates/dislikes crimes.
c. The mayor hates/dislikes property crimes.
2.3. Taking Stock
The results of this section have mostly been a negative characterization
of the designation of bare singular crime: it designates neither a sub-
stance, nor a collective, nor a plural entity. While designating some sort
of event or events, it does not reference a concrete particular event in
the way bare plural crimes seems able to do. One positive trait that can
be put forth is that bare singular crime does manifest kind reference, at
the expense of the bare plural.
Yet, bare singular crime is also used in clearly episodic contexts, as
in (30), which, as already shown in example (10), are number neutral,
able to refer to singularities and pluralities.
(30) Crime destroyed this town.
One line of analysis would be to consider the non-generic use of bare
singular crime to be obligatorily non-specific, designating crimes un-
known to the speaker. This would fit in well with data from existen-
tials, which have a well-documented aversion to definite and specific
noun phrases. As shown in (31), an existential sentence hosts the bare
singular crime, yet the bare plural crimes is degraded.
(31) a. There is crime in Miami.
b. ?There are crimes in Miami. (as an “out-of-the-blue" state-
ment)
There is, however, a clear piece of evidence that weighs against char-
acterizing bare singular crime as inherently non-specific, namely that
crime may occur with the definite determiner and retain the reading
obtained in the bare singular, as in (32). I conclude that non-specificity
is not the right distinction.
(32) The crime in Philadelphia has improved.
What we seem to be left with is a meaning type which while some-
how referring to individual crimes, does not do so overtly, and further
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does not discriminate between singular and plural crimes. This situa-
tion, in many but not all ways, is reminiscent of the weakly referential
meaning assigned to the semantics of nominals in incorporation con-
structions, which also display number-neutrality. I would like to sug-
gest that the contrast between non-countable crime and countable crime
is a reflex of a very broad distinction, articulated as early as (Strawson
1954), between general and particular modes of reference. Thus, in ad-
dition to its bare singular use to refer to an event kind, non-countable
crime in episodic contexts is employed to refer to crime acts generally,
without committing oneself to any particular events, where by ‘particu-
lar’, I mean with reference to spatio-temporally bounded entities. Thus
when referring to particular events, the plural is appropriate, and even
the bare plural of crime appears to imply particular events, which makes
sense of its infelicity in positions where bare plurals would otherwise
flourish.10
According to this view, crime makes a three-way distinction: non-
countable crime manifests both a use referring to an event kind as well
as a non-particularized use, referring to instances of crime, but without
making any claims to these instances being spatio-temporally located
or being of a particular number (singular or plural); both of these uses
contrast with countable crime.
Having isolated a variety of meaning distinctions and contrasts for
crime, I now turn to gaining a broader view on the distributional be-
havior of crime.
3. CRIME STATISTICS
The last section explored the meaning of countable and non-countable
crime through standard linguistic methodology. In this section, I will
examine the distribution of crime, along with that of other select nouns,
from the viewpoint of its distribution over a large corpus of occurrences.
This section will add convergent evidence, first, that countable and non-
countable crime have distinct interpretations and, second, that the bare
plural of crime behaves more similarly to object-level referential uses of
crime than to kind-level uses typically associated with bare plurals.
The results of this section, however, should be seen as preliminary,
since I will be comparing the behavior of crime with the behaviors of
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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Figure 1: Distribution of Bare and Non-Bare Uses of Substance Nouns
nouns from a limited sample, and at present we do not have a general
understanding of the distributional characteristics of nouns as a whole
with respect to countability. Thus, there is no proper baseline estab-
lished for comparison, and accordingly, there is no guarantee that the
nouns I am examining, inspired by the literature, are truly represen-
tative. Similar considerations apply for the reported behavior of the
bare plural. Despite these caveats, the results are suggestive and will
hopefully serve to stimulate yet more comprehensive studies.
3.1. The Distribution of Countable Nouns, Non-Countable Nouns and Crime
The diagnostics employed in the previous section indicated that crime
behaved differently from either standard countable or standard non-
countable nouns. A clear prediction is that these differences would be
reflected in usage patterns in a corpus. I examined this prediction across
a substantial portion, 88 million words, of the COCA corpus (Davies
2008), which was parsed via the Stanford Dependency Parser (de Marn-
effe et al. 2006), and then further analyzed using a suite of Python
scripts which extracted distributional information such as argument po-
sition, co-occurrence with determiners, quantifiers, etc. Here I will only
report on several broad trends that are visible in the data. Much more
detailed studies using such techniques are possible and should be pur-
sued in the future, although they are beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Bare and Non-Bare Uses of Nouns Designating
Individual Entities
The distribution of different nouns has been calculated for three
noun types: bare singular, bare plural, and non-bare. “Bare” oc-
currences exclude determiners or quantifiers, although other modi-
fiers, such as adjectival modifiers may be present. “Non-bare” is a
catch-all category, which includes occurrences with determiners, nu-
merals, quantifiers or possessives. The use of the bare singular in-
dicates the noun’s propensity towards interpretations associated with
non-countability, e.g. a high number of occurrences for the bare sin-
gular of water generally corresponds to a high rate of referring to the
substance water, although of course there is another use referring to
the kind water present as well. The use of the bare plural generally
corresponds to the noun’s propensity towards generic/kind readings
for nouns which may be countable, as well as non-standard interpreta-
tions (e.g. “packaging” or subkind readings) for non-countable nouns.
Both the bare singular uses and the bare plural uses contrast with those
in which the noun’s reference is otherwise quantified or determined,
which are the non-bare uses.
A preliminary question that must be answered before we turn to
how the usage of crime differs from standard countable and non-
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countable nouns is whether we can, in the first place, detect differences
between standard countable and non-countable nouns. Figure 1 reports
on the distribution of five substance nouns, which I will simply assume
represent canonical non-countable nouns: gold, oil, salt, sand, and wa-
ter. As one would expect, the vast majority of uses of all these nouns is
the bare singular, while the bare plural uses, which include “packaged”
as well as subkind readings, are the least frequent. Figure 2 gives the
distribution of five nouns designating individual entities, which I will
assume represent canonical countable nouns: book, boy, car, cat, and
dog. In contrast to substance nouns, the large majority of uses of all of
the nouns are determined/quantified (non-bare) uses, while bare sin-
gulars are the least frequent, and bare plural uses average about 26% of
the occurrences. Thus, for both substance nouns and individual nouns,
as far as they are represented by this sample, one can identify a single
primary use, the bare singular and the non-bare use, respectively, along
with secondary, minor uses.
Turning to crime, the observed distribution argues for two major
uses, namely the bare singular use and the non-bare use, as shown in
figure 3, along with a proportion of bare plural uses similar to what
was observed for countable nouns. This split in usage is not unique to
crime, but is also detectable for “flexible nouns” which have two distinct
interpretations, one naming a type of entity and one naming the mate-
rial composing that type of entity (see discussion in Barner & Snedeker
2005). Figure 4 shows the distributions of the nouns brick, stone, rope
and string. Unlike the distributions of substance or individual nouns,
there is a substantial bare singular use as well as a substantial non-bare
use.11 The distribution of crime and its parallel with flexible nouns as
opposed to standard countable and non-countable nouns strengthens
the case for two distinct interpretations of crime rather than deriving
the non-countable uses from the countable ones or vice versa.
At this point, the general trends in the data accord with what would
be expected given the results of the diagnostics in the last section. I
now turn to investigating these different noun types and the interaction
between syntactic position and noun type.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Bare and Non-Bare Uses of Crime
Figure 4: Distribution of Bare and Non-Bare Uses of Flexible Nouns
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3.2. Distribution Across Syntactic Positions
Beyond just observing that the distribution of crime differs from stan-
dard countable and non-countable nouns, the corpus data add more
evidence for the more specific claim put forward in the previous sec-
tion, namely that the bare plural of crime was closer in interpretation
to referential uses, in particular, not allowing the range of kind-level
interpretations seen as typical of bare plurals.
Figure 5: Distribution of Bare Plurals and Non-Bare Nouns by Argument
Position
For most of the nouns which designate individual entities, e.g. dog,
there are proportionally fewer bare plurals than nouns whose reference
is determined or quantified, both in subject and direct object position.
The distribution of the canonical countable nouns in subject and direct
object position is given in figure 5.12 Some exceptions to this trend
are present. First, the noun book actually has more uses of bare plu-
rals in the direct object position, which is due to a high number of
incorporation-like uses with the fixed phrase reading books. Second,
for boy and cat, the difference in proportion of use in the direct object
position is not statistically significant, and similarly for car in subject
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position. So this tendency is far from absolute, yet still seems to be
robust.13
A more general picture results from contrasting the appearance in
argument positions, which here are taken to be subject or direct object,
as opposed to non-argument positions. Figure 6 shows, for the same
canonical countable nouns, the mean proportion of occurrence for bare
plurals and non-bare nouns contrasted across argument positions and
non-argument positions. As can be readily seen, bare plurals gener-
ally occur less in argument positions and more outside of argument
positions, and conversely for nouns with determined or quantified ref-
erence.
Against the backdrop of the general picture of bare plurals in count-
able nouns, I now turn to bare plurals of crime.14 Figure 7 shows the
distribution of the bare singular, bare plural and non-bare uses of crime
contrasting the appearance in argument position or in non-argument
position. The proportion of bare plurals and non-bare nouns are nearly
identical (44.5% vs. 44.6%) and not statistically significant.15 In sum,
the diagnostics in section 2 indicated that the bare plural uses of crime
behaved differently from the bare singular uses, but similarly to refer-
ential uses. The lack of distributional contrast between the bare plural
uses and uses with determined or quantified reference lends supporting
evidence to this observation.
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Figure 6: Distribution of Bare Plurals and Non-Bare Nouns by Argument
Position
Figure 7: Distribution of Bare and Non-Bare Uses of crime Across Argu-
ment Positions
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4. CONCLUSION
This study of crime has shown that our empirical understanding of
countability, and various other aspects of nominal semantics, is far from
complete. I have argued that the contrast between countable and non-
countable interpretations of crime do not conform to the meaning con-
trasts one might expect, such as atomic vs. non-atomic or inherently
plural. Instead, while uses of non-countable crime often allow one to
infer something about concrete crime events, it itself does not designate
any particular crimes, but refers to crime generally. That a contrast be-
tween referring to events more particularly or more generally might
result in countability contrasts is not a notion which has been widely
entertained, but crime appears to force us to recognize the possibility.
A further implication of this study is that there is a wide range of
lexical semantic work that needs to be undertaken to gain a more com-
plete picture of how countability may be established across different
semantic domains. There are a large number of similarly under- or un-
explored nouns, and it remains to be seen whether the distinction pro-
posed here for crime would extend to other nouns, say practice, sport,
or famine, or if yet some further set of distinctions are in play.
Notes
1I would like to thank the organizers of the 11th International Symposium of Cogni-
tion, Logic and Communication, Jurg‘ is Šk, ilters and Susan Rothstein, who assembled a
truly engaging and enjoyable conference. I would also like to thank Fred Landman, who
gave me detailed comments on a prior draft, which led to many improvements. The usual
disclaimers apply.
2See also Behrens (1995), who discusses a wide range of nouns beyond those that
dominate the literature, including crime and related terms such as theft.
3Here I use ‘act’ pre-theoretically and limit the discussion to acts which may be classi-
fied as crimes, although the picture is certainly more complicated given that non-action
can also be criminal, as in the case of criminal negligence.
4From 1824-2013, it was a crime to “be an incorrigible rogue" in England and Wales,
yet now British and Welsh citizens are at liberty to be one. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/n
ews/article-2522671/309-crimes-removed-law-books-outdated-offences-repealed.html
5Examples are taken from https://www.wklaw.com/can-a-single-crime-lead-to-mul
tiple-punishments/.
6Scontras & Goodman (2015) show that under certain contextual conditions, speakers
may accept the collective reading, but for the purposes here, Schwarzschild’s (2011) point
stands.
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7One does find many occurrences of “big crime”, yet this is a fixed phrase, at least in
American English, for organized crime, cf. “Big Tobacco” or “Big Oil”.
8As is known, attributive, non-restrictive contexts often favor distributive readings
(Schwarzschild 2006).
9Non-countable crime may be found with the verb count, but tellingly not in episodic
contexts where particular crimes are at issue. A licit example is provided in the following
sentence from a government pamphlet on crime in California where crime very generally
is discussed: Crime is counted in two different ways. One is based on official reports to law
enforcement agencies. . . Crime is also counted based on surveys of individuals to determine
if they have been victims of crime. . . https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cjsc/
publications/misc/cinc/califcrime.pdf
10Although a formal analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, analyses of weak nomi-
nal reference have been advanced in multiple ways in the literature, for instance, for exis-
tentials in McNally (1997), incorportation in Farkas & Swart (2003) or Chung & Ladusaw
(2004), or through Chierchia’s (1998a) ‘Derived Kind Predication’. Sorting out in detail
to what degree these and related proposals apply to non-countable eventive nouns like
crime and other abstract nouns is something I leave to future work.
11It is noteworthy that the distributions of brick and stone resemble each other, as do
those of rope and string, as expected given the nearness in meaning.
12I have reduced the noun types to just those of interest, the bare plural and non-bare
nouns, as the bare singular occurrences are not relevant for the points at hand.
13The general trend was present in a range of other concrete nouns that I investigated
but do not report on here.
14A large number of uses of crime, over a third, were arguably subkind uses, viz. envi-
ronmental crimes, military crimes, war crimes, which involve yet different properties that
fall outside the scope of this paper. I excluded uses which were parsed as containing
a compound or adjectival modifiers (the majority of which were modifiers like ‘enviro-
mental’), and uses of crime which governed a preposition, since these were majoritarily
phrases such as crimes against humanity. To maintain comparability, the canonical count-
able noun counts shown in figures 5 and 6 were similarly reduced, although this did not
affect the general trends reported for these nouns.
15A closer look at the distribution of subject and direct objects also shows no statistically
significant distinction between bare plurals and non-bare arguments either for subjects
(χ2 = 3.17, 1, .074) or objects (χ2 = 2.22, 1, .136), although there is a trend for the
former.
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